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STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, . ] 
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ANDREW WEISBERG [ 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
> APPELLANT'S OPENING 
I BRIEF 
) Case No. 20001056-CA 
I Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of Andrew Weisberg 
("Appellant") for Stalking, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-5-106.5(2) (2000). See Addendum I. 
This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal of a criminal case involving 
a second degree felony, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to arrest judgment based upon 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate a weapon was used in connection with a stalking? 
"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of an arrest of judgment, we 
review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. We will sustain the trial court's decision unless the 
jury verdict is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that 
all reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 
P.2d 177 (citations omitted). 
2. Did the trial court err in giving an improper jury instruction as to the definition of 
"use of a weapon" over Appellant's objection? 
"An assertion on appeal that a jury instruction incorrectly stated the law presents a 
question of law which we review for correctness." State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 989-90 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), cited in State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 989 P.2d 503. 
3. Did the trial court err in not granting Appellant's motion to dismiss based upon the 
unconstitutionality of the stalking statute? 
The challenge to the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are referred 
to in Appellant's Brief and our reproduced at Addendum II: First, Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution; Utah Constitution, article I, section 1; Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-106.5(2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
An Amended Information filed on or about April 20,2000, charged Appellant 
with Stalking, a second degree felony (R. 001). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Appellant proceeded to trial by jury before the Honorable Pamela G. 
Heffernan, on October 25, 2000 (R. 119-122). 
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C. Disposition in Trial Court 
Appellant was found guilty of stalking on October 26, 2000. (R. 125)1. 
Appellant was sentenced on November 30, 2000, to one to fifteen years in prison (R. 255-
56). A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on November 28, 2000 (R. 253). See Addendum 
III. 
D. Statement of the Facts \ 
The charges in the instant case arose based upon allegations that Appellant 
began stalking Robin Archibald as a result of a business deal gone bad. Wayne Ogden was 
a client of Avis and Archibald, a title company in which Robin Archibald was a partner 
(R.261, p. 30). During the course of Wayne Ogden's involvement with Avis and Archibald, 
Appellant was with Wayne Ogden at a meeting at Avis and Archibald sometime in April or 
May of 1997. Id. As a result of Appellant investing with Wayne Ogden and his use of Avis 
and Archibald, Appellant lost a substantial amount of money (R.261, p.31). Appellant sued 
Avis and Archibald for his claimed loss of $ 115,000 (R.261, p.20). Appellant believed that 
Avis and Archibald owed him $26,000 (R.261, p.31). After several meetings that Archibald 
had with Wayne Ogden, one of the last meetings involved Appellant. Id. At this meeting 
1
 Counsel on appeal did not represent Appellant during the proceedings held in the 
trial court. 
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both Wayne Ogden and Appellant had displayed a small shotgun, which Archibald was led 
to believe belonged to Ogden. The reason for the weapon was that Ogden and Appellant 
brought a substantial amount of cash to the meeting. This display of the gun was not done 
in any type of threatening manner (R.261, p.33). Archibald was nervous, because guns can 
discharge, but she was not fearful of anything (R.261, p.33). Ogden and Appellant had 
brought a substantial amount of money into Avis and Archibald, which needed to be 
counted, and Archibald assumed that was why they had the weapon with them (R.261, p.33). 
Archibald did not want to take responsibility for that amount of money, so Ogden and 
Appellant took the money back and later brought a cashier's check to Archibald (R.261, 
p.34). In August, 1997, Appellant filed suit against Avis and Archibald when his investment 
went south and his money was gone (R.261, p.35). At some point following the filing of the 
suit, Appellant came into Avis and Archibald's office asking for his money. Id. These were 
the only two occasions that Appellant had ever come into the business (R.261, p.92). 
On August 11,1997, Archibald received a fax which read: "liar, liar" and bore 
an imprint of C & A Properties across it. Archibald stated that C & A Properties was a 
business in which Appellant was a principle (R.261, p.36). Appellant was seen driving by 
the Avis and Archibald business several times, which is located in a business center/strip 
mall area in Odgen, Utah. (R.261, p.37-38). There was only one entrance into the parking 
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area where these businesses were located (R.261, p.95). Archibald also received a voice mail 
message at work from someone who disguised their voice stating, "Robin, you better back 
off or you're going to find you cold, dead body in a field somewhere." (R.261, p.38). 
Archibald did not recognize the voice. Id. Archibald began seeing Appellant drive near or 
past her business all the time (R.261, p. 39). 
On October 14,1997, while Archibald was at work late, she heard a loud noise 
outside which caught her attention. She noticed Appellant's truck parked outside the 
business and that he was inside staring at her. (R.261, p.40). Archibald called the police, and 
was told to get a license plate number. She was able to retrieve the license, but the vehicle 
left before the police arrived (R.261, p.42-43). Archibald believed that Appellant was there 
four to five minutes (R.261, p.43). She was very nervous (R.261, p.44). Over the next six 
months, Appellant would drive by the business an average of once a week. Id. Archibald 
was aware, however, that Appellant did business with other businesses in the area and would 
see him go into other businesses on numerous occasions.(R.261 p.48-49) 
On April 6,1998, there was an incident at a Wingers restaurant. Archibald and 
her assistant, Cassandra Hall, were driving to Wingers for lunch and saw Appellant in the 
parking lot (R.261, p.51). Archibald decided not to eat at Wingers and left, but then came 
back a few minutes later believing Appellant had left. Id. When Archibald pulled back into 
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the parking lot of Wingers, Appellant was still there in his vehicle and was on his cell phone 
(R.261, p.52). As Archibald and Hall walked into the restaurant, Appellant appeared near 
the entrance, which startled her (R.261, p.53). Archibald stated that Appellant had on a coat 
and reached into his lapel and pulled out his cell phone-like a move someone would do for 
a gun-but she could see it was a phone. Id. Archibald and Hall walked through the doors 
of the restaurant, and Appellant followed behind and slapped his hand loudly on the door 
(R.261, p.54). There was no discussion or conversation with Appellant. Id. Archibald and 
Hall were seated in a booth and Appellant turned and went the opposite direction into the 
restroom (R.261, p.55). Appellant came out of the bathroom and mumbled something to 
Archibald as he passed, but she could only understand him saying something about, "black." 
Id. Seated a couple of booths behind Archibald was Dennis Porter and other business 
acquaintances that she knew. Hall observed Appellant sit down with Porter at his table 
(R.261, p.56). A few minutes later, Appellant was leaving and according to Archibald, he 
flipped her off as he passed. Id. Porter then came up to Archibald and asked her what she 
did to get Appellant so mad, and he related other statements Appellant had made about her, 
which scared her. (R.261, p.57). 
Another instance in October 1998, was related to Archibald by Hall, who 
informed her that Appellant had stopped her in the parking lot outside the business and 
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asked Hall why she worked for a bunch of thieves (R.261, p.58). Archibald continued to see 
Appellant all the time driving by her business. 
In June of 1999, Archibald was driving from Morgan to Ogden and saw 
Appellant in a different vehicle driving next to her, staring at her for about one block 
(R.261, p.59-60). Appellant did not follow her, but she saw him again as she got closer to 
an intersection near her business (R.261, p.62). Archibald went around by an Alberton' s and 
saw Appellant parked in his vehicle as if he was waiting for her (R.261, p.63-64). Archibald 
called the police and waited for them to arrive (R.261, p. 64). The police detained Appellant 
at that time, and Archibald returned to work (R.261, p.65). Officer Chet Bingham was able 
to confirm that Appellant was returning from Layton to drop of a co-worker on this occasion 
(R.262, p. 174). Archibald saw Appellant again in the parking lot of her business later that 
day (R.261, p.65). 
Archibald continued to see Appellant around her business less frequently, 
maybe two or three times a month (R.261, p.66). In August 1999, there was an agreement 
between Appellant and the police that he would not have any contact with Archibald and not 
be in the parking lot (R.261, p.66-67). However, the day after the verbal agreement was in 
place, Appellant was in the parking lot of the business (R.261, p.68). Appellant continued 
to be in the parking lot after August, going into other businesses, or sometimes just his 
vehicle would be in the parking lot (R.261, p.68). Archibald noticed his picket sign laid 
across his vehicle (R.261, p.69). Archibald indicated that the picketing did not bother her 
or prompt her to call police, and that Appellant's picketing continued throughout October 
and November of 1999 (R.261, p.71). Archibald also received several hang up calls and 
messages at her office, from an unknown source, saying, "You better back off or your dead." 
(R.261, p.72). 
On December 23, 1999, everything came to a stop when Appellant was seen 
outside the business again, and employees observed him parked outside. Someone inside the 
business screamed that he had a gun. (R.261, p. 76). Melissa Bear, an employee at the time, 
saw Appellant walk from the driver's side to the passenger's side of the vehicle, take a gun 
out of the passenger's side and place it in his trunk (R.261, p. 132). The gun was never 
pointed at anyone (R.261, p. 133). Another employee, Stephanie Ware, corroborated Bear's 
account involving the gun, and that Appellant had popped the trunk of his car, walked to 
passenger's side, retrieved a gun (holding it with the barrel down), placed it in the trunk and 
drove away (R.262, p. 161).Archibald never saw Appellant or the gun on this occasion, but 
was present in her office and called the police. (R.261, p. 133). Appellant left before the 
police responded, but Appellant came back to the area later that day (R.261, p. 81). Archibald 
never saw a gun, but understood that there was one in the trunk of Appellant's car. Id. At 
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this same time, Officer Dwight Ruth ("Ruth") was across the street from the business doing 
reports, when he noticed Appellant in the parking lot (R. 262, p.204). Ruth noticed 
Appellant go into the dry cleaning business nearby, but had nothing with him (R.262, 
p.205). Ruth observed Appellant return and take something from his car and put it in his i 
trunk, but could not see what it was (R.262, p.207). Ruth received a dispatch a few second 
later and stopped Appellant's vehicle. Id. 
When Appellant returned to the business later that day with his picket sign, he 
was arrested (R.261, p.83). All instances of driving past or parking at the business ceased 
i 
from that point on (R.261, p.76). Archibald described the effect that Appellant had on her 
- from contributing to her separation from her husband, to a fear of not going anywhere 
alone (R.261, p.72-73). < 
Randall Layton testified that he occasionally did business with Avis and 
Archibald and saw Appellant outside one day in his vehicle (R.262, p. 143-44). Appellant 
told him not to do business with Avis and Archibald. Id. Layton indicated that there was 
nothing out of the ordinary about his contact with Appellant (R.262, p. 147). Over 
Appellant's objection, Layton testified that he spoke with Appellant approximately two and 
one-half weeks before trial and attempted to ask Appellant about the day he saw him at Avis 
• • - > • • • i 
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and Archibald. Appellant told Layton he should mind his "fucking business" and that he was 
going to "kick his butt." (R.262, p. 145-50). 
After the State rested, Appellant moved to dismiss the charge based upon the 
unconstitutionality of the statute, which was denied (R.262, p.218, 235). Appellant also 
moved for a reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor, arguing that there was no "use" of 
a firearm, which motion was also denied (R.262, p.235, 241). Appellant also lodged an 
objection to Instruction No. 34, which defined "use of a dangerous weapon." (R.262, p.318). 
Instruction 34 stated: 
Use of a dangerous weapon is defined as bringing or putting it into 
service or action or to put it to some purpose. If you find that a firearm is a 
dangerous weapon in this case, then its use may include, but is not limited to 
the following: pointing it at a person, shooting it, or exhibiting it in such a 
manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person. 
(R.163). The trial court ruled against Appellant. The jury found Appellant guilty of second 
degree felony stalking. (R.262, p.318). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues that his conviction for stalking as a second degree felony is 
erroneous because he did not "use" a firearm in connection to a stalking offense. The 
evidence presented at trial, in the light most favorable to the State, indicated that Appellant 
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was outside Archibald's business in his vehicle. He walked to the passenger's side of the 
vehicle, retrieved a gun and placed it in the trunk of the vehicle. At no time did he point the 
weapon at anyone, and in fact, had the barrel pointed towards the ground. In addition, 
Archibald, the alleged victim, never saw any of this activity. Appellant submits that he did 
not actively employ the weapon in connection with any offense, as the statute requires. As 
such, the most serious offense for which he could have been convicted was for a Class A 
misdemeanor stalking. 
In conjunction with the above argument, Appellant submits that the jury 
instruction regarding the definition of use of a weapon was improper. In light of United 
States Supreme Court precedent and other persuasive case law, the "use" of a weapon 
involves some type of active employment. The instruction given to the jury regarding this 
definition did not appropriately state that standard, nor make it clear that something more 
than possession was required. 
Notwithstanding the above, Appellant submits that his conviction should be 
reversed altogether, given that the stalking statute is unconstitutional on its face, as well as 
applied to him under the particular circumstances of the case. Appellant was involved in 
lawful, constitutionally protected activities, such as picketing and frequenting public places, 
so that his conviction of stalking for engaging in those activities is unconstitutional. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
ARREST JUDGMENT BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
DEMONSTRATE A WEAPON WAS USED IN CONNECTION WITH A 
STALKING 
A. Standard of Review 
"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of an arrest of 
judgment, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. We will sustain the trial court's 
decision unless the jury verdict is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an 
element of the crime that all reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177 (citations omitted). 
D. Insufficient Evidence that a Weapon was "Used" in Connection with 
a Stalking 
Appellant was convicted of second degree felony stalking based upon the 
allegation that he "used a dangerous weapon... in the commission of the crime of stalking." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(6)(a) (2000). The word "use" means " to carry out a purpose 
or action by means of, to make instrumental to an end or process and to apply to advantage." 
-13-
i 
People v. Chambers, 498 P.2d 1024,1027-28 (Ca. 1972)(quoting Webster's New Intern'l. 
Diet. (3d ed. 1961)). The only testimony presented at trial to support that allegation, was that 
Appellant drove to the alleged victim's business, parked his vehicle outside the business, and 
was seen taking a gun out of the passenger's side of his vehicle and placing it in the trunk 
of his vehicle. See R. 261, p. 132-33. The gun was never pointed or raised towards anyone. 
See R. 261, p. 133. Furthermore, the alleged victim of the stalking never witnessed this event, 
nor was she at a location in her office where she could have witnessed this event. R. 261, 
p.76-78. This information was merely related to her by other employees of the business. Id. 
The standard of review in such a sufficiency argument is that the court will 
reverse only if the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985-86 (Utah 1993). 
Stated another way, appellate courts will affirm the jury verdict if "there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made." State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87-88 (Utah 1993). 
Appellant submits that the facts elicited at trial on this allegation cannot be 
sufficient to support his conviction for second degree felony stalking by "using" a dangerous 
weapon in the commission of the crime of stalking. The dangerous weapon was never "used," 
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it was merely moved from one location in his vehicle to another location, all while the vehicle 
was parked outside the business. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted a similar 
issue regarding what constitutes "use" of a firearm in connection with a crime. In Bailey v. 
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), the court held that in order to convict a defendant of 
using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense, the statute requires evidence 
sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, and that evidence 
of the proximity and accessibility of the firearm to drugs is not alone sufficient to support a 
conviction for "use" under the statute. Id. Although the Bailey court dealt with the 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which imposes a prison term for a person who 
"during and in relation to a . . . drug trafficking crime... uses or carries a firearm," Appellant 
submits that the rationale applies to the instant case. In Bailey, the defendant had a firearm 
inside a bag in the trunk of his car, where drugs were also discovered in the passenger 
compartment. Id. at 138. The Supreme Court stated that "use" in this context "must connote 
more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense." Id. at 143. 
In addition, the court added that "the inert presence of a firearm, without more, is not enough 
to trigger § 924(c)(1)... [and that] storage of a firearm, without its more active employment, 
is not reasonably distinguishable from possession." Id. at 149. 
-15-
( 
In applying the Bailey rationale to the instant case, Appellant submits that his 
possession of the firearm in this case was merely akin to storing the firearm in his vehicle, 
and that his deliberate effort to not point it toward anyone or make any demonstrative 
movement with the firearm did not involve any type of "active employment" to assist in the ( 
commission of the offense as required by the statute. At most, Appellant was merely in 
possession the firearm, and in no way employed its "use" to assist in the commission of the 
( 
offense of stalking. 
Several other courts have resolved similar cases in this same manner, by 
requiring that the "use" of a weapon must be something more active than mere possession. 
See United States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(holding that where 
defendant agreed to receive guns in exchange for drugs, he was not "using" the gun in < 
connection with a drug trafficking crime); United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 
1999)(same); United States v. Taylor, 176 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 1999)(defendant's conviction 
for use of firearm in connection with conspiracy to violate Hobbs Act (robbery) reversed 
because defendant merely transported weapon to co-conspirator days before the robbery -
held there was no active employment of the weapon); Buschauer v. State, 804 P.2d 1046, 
1049 (Nev. 1990)(declaring "use" of a weapon in the commission of a crime indicates that 
the instrumentality must be used in conscious furtherance of a criminal objective); State v. < 
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Petrak, 8 P.3d 1174,1179-80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)(holding that a nexus must be established 
between the crime and the weapon). 
Appellant submits that the rationale in Bailey and other cases cited above 
applies to the instant case for the proposition that moving a weapon to a different location in 
a vehicle parked outside of a business where an alleged stalking victim works, is not active 
employment of that weapon in connection with a stalking offense. In addition, there was 
never a sufficient nexus established by the evidence between the weapon and the crime of 
stalking for which Appellant was convicted. The alleged victim was never present when the 
gun was observed, nor did witnesses who observed the gun indicate that it was actively 
employed in any manner in an attempt to facilitate a stalking offense. Witnesses described 
Appellant as merely removing the gun from the passenger's side of his vehicle, holding it 
barrel down, and securing it in the trunk of his vehicle. There was no active employment or 
use of the weapon in connection with the stalking offense. Consequently, there was 
insufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant the second degree felony conviction. 
At most, counsel submits that this Court should amend the conviction to reflect 
the appropriate degree of offense, absent the use of a firearm, which would be a Class A 
misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(4)(2000). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN IMPROPER JURY 
INSTRUCTION AS TO THE DEFINITION OF "USE OF A WEAPON" 
OVER APPELLANT'S OBJECTION 
A. Standard of Review < 
"An assertion on appeal that a jury instruction incorrectly stated the law 
presents a question of law which we review for correctness." State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 
989-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cited in State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 3059 989 P.2d 503. 
B. Improper Statement of the Law 
Appellant submits that the jury instruction No. 34, which defined "use of a 
dangerous weapon" was improper. Instruction 34 stated: 
( 
Use of a dangerous weapon is defined as bringing or putting it into 
service or action or to put it to some purpose. If you find that a firearm is a 
dangerous weapon in this case, then its use may include, but is not limited to 
the following: pointing it at a person, shooting it, or exhibiting it in such a 
manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person. ( 
(R.163). Appellant submits that following the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Bailey, supra, the state of the law regarding "use" of a weapon in connection with an offense 
was defined as some type of active employment as argued in Point I. The jury instruction 
given by the State, and objected to by Appellant's trial counsel, was not an accurate definition 
< 
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of the current state of the law. As such, the trial court erred in instructing the jury in that 
regard. Bailey and the other cases relied upon in Point I, supra, indicate that in order to 
satisfy the "use" element in connection with another offense, there must be some type of 
active employment. The definition relied upon by the State and the trial court did not clearly 
meet that definition. As such, the trial court committed reversible error. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE STALKING STATUTE 
A. Standard of Review 
The challenge to the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
B. Unconstitutional on its Face 
Appellant submits that the stalking statute is unconstitutional on the basis of 
vagueness and over breadth. The stalking statute under which Appellant was convicted reads 
as follows: 
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A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a 
specific person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of 
his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to 
himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his 
immediate family will suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to 
himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member 
of his immediate family. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (2000). Several definitions which are relevant to this statute 
are defined as follows: 
(a) "course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or 
physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats 
or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a 
person. 
(b) "immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any 
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided 
in the household within the prior six months. 
(c) "repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(1) (2000). 
1. Vagueness 
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The due process clause of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution require that a criminal statute be declared void when it is so vague that 
"men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application." Connally v. General Constr, Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984). 
The Supreme Court has explained the relationship between due process and 
vagueness as follows: 
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if 
its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important 
values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and 
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence 
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.2 
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws 
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries 
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague 
statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it 
"operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." Uncertain meanings 
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ' . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 
2
 A statute which is uncertain as to persons who may fall within its scope will also be 
found unconstitutionally vague. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
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Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (citations omitted). See also 
i 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357-58 (1983) (citations omitted) ("where the legislature 
fails to provide . . . minimal guidelines [to govern law enforcement], a criminal statute may 
permit 'a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their < 
personal predilections.'").3 Statutes which are vague have been struck as unconstitutional on 
their face. See Kolender, supra. The Supreme Court has invalidated a criminal statute on its 
face even when the statute could conceivably have had some valid application. See, e.g., 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, n. 8. In Zissi v. State 
Tax Comm., 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992), the Utah supreme court states: 
We will find a statute to be unconstitutionally vague... when it is insufficiently 
explicit and clear to inform the reader of common intelligence what conduct 
is proscribed . . . . We apply this test in light of the fact that exactitude of < 
language is seldom possible. Consequently, we will not invalidate a statute for 
vagueness if any sensible, practical effect can be given to the contested 
statutory terms. 
M a t 854. ( 
1 
3
 The three standards set forth by the court are independent of each other. Thus, a statute 
may offend due process simply by violating one of the three standards. See generally, 
LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 2.3, at 128-32 (1986). See also NAACP v. 
Burton,31l U.S. 415 (1963).
 { 
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Thus, a preliminary issue to be determined on appeal is whether the statute 
gives a person of ordinary intelligence "a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, 
so that he may act accordingly," as noted as the first element in Grayned and Zissi. It is clear 
that a person of ordinary intelligence most likely cannot determine what would constitute 
lawful picketing of a business, from "stalking" someone by engaging in physical proximity 
to that person which would cause emotional stress. Therefore, it is almost, if not totally 
impossible that such a person can reasonably conduct himself or herself to conform to such 
a law. Consequently, the statute on its face is extremely broad and criminalizes potentially 
innocent conduct. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. Accordingly, it is void for vagueness under 
the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, as it fails 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden 
by the statute. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 
1987); Zissi, 842 P.2d at 854. 
The second standard requires that "if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them." This 
statute provides no explicit standards to define what is required for stalking. This is 
evidenced by Appellant being told by law enforcement officers on various occasions that he 
could be outside the business picketing, and on several other occasions, by different law 
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enforcement officers that he could not picket outside the business. It leaves the reasonable 
i 
person to guess whether that conduct is permissible or not. Such a vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to law enforcement, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory i 
application, without any notice to potential defendants that their conduct may violate such 
a statute. r 
1 
The third factor set forth in Groyned indicates that where a vague statute "abuts 
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise 
1 
of those freedoms." Consequently, uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "' steer far 
wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). Because of the I 
uncertain and vague language of the statute, it inhibits Appellant's rights to picket a 
business. In order for him to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone," whatever that may be, 
may require him to limit his First Amendment freedoms. 
Although this court held in Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 93 5 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. 
1 
App. 1997), that this statute was not void for vagueness, Appellant submits that the fact that 
the Court did not address a situation in Lopez where legitimate, protected, First Amendment 
right was at issue, warrants reconsideration of that decision. Lopez did not involve an ( 
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individual exercising his right to picket a business or frequent particular businesses in an area 
where he may not be wanted. This is not the similar type of "stalking" case which this Court 
addressed in Lopez, and consequently, Appellant argues that this Court should reconsider that 
case in light of the present circumstances. 
2. Overbreadth 
Statutory language is overbroad if its language proscribes both harmful and 
innocuous behavior. Stated another way, a statute is overbroad if it attempts to sanction 
constitutionally protected activities. Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1263 (citations omitted). Criminal 
statutes require particular scrutiny when challenged for overbreadth and may be facially 
invalid if they make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, even 
if they also have legitimate application. State v. Lee, 957 P.2d 741 (Wash. 1998). 
Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides for the right of men to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions. Utah Const, art. I, sec. 1. A law is overbroad 
under the free speech provision of the State Constitution to the extent that it announces a 
prohibition that reaches conduct which may not be prohibited. State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379, 
382-83 (Or. 1999). As argued above under the vagueness doctrine, this particular statute 
reaches non-prohibitive conduct, such as one's right to picket a business, or remain lawfully 
in public places. Appellant was merely exercising those rights in the instant case, which 
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should not encompass his conduct as criminal under the stalking statute. The stalking statute 
i 
should be interpreted as unconstitutionally overbroad because it does sanction 
constitutionally protected activities, even though it also has a legitimate application. 
A defendant who inadvertently encounters another person in a public place has 1 
not "knowingly" approached or appeared within sight of that person within the meaning of 
the stalking statute. Peterson v. State, 930 P.2d 414 (Ala. Ct. App. 1996). Appellant was 
convicted based upon his numerous "sightings" near Archibald's business, which is located 
in a public business complex. As the Peterson court outlines, merely seeing someone in a 
public place where they have every right to be cannot fall within the concept of stalking. As 
such, the potential for encompassing legitimate behavior through the stalking statute should 
result in its unconstitutionality based upon its far-reaching application to lawful conduct. < 
C. Unconstitutional as Applied to Appellant 
Furthermore, a statute that is not facially unconstitutional may be 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its application. United States v. Agnew, 931 F.2d 
1397, 1403 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 884,112 S. Ct. 237 (1991). Here, the issue on , 
appeal is that as applied to Appellant, this statute prohibits the lawful exercise of free speech 
and his ability to protest or picket a business establishment. According to the language of the 
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statute, Appellant had the potential for being charged or not being charged based upon this 
type of conduct. There is nothing in the language of the stalking statute that determines when 
such conduct will fall outside the parameters of the statute and when it will not. 
Differentiating between which conduct is proscribed is at best guesswork, and the statute's 
broad language offers no guidance. Therefore, Appellant could not have conducted himself 
in such a way as to avoid the sanctions of the statute, which "creates a trap for the wary as 
well as the unwary." Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030,111 S. Ct. 2720,2731-
32 (1991). As such, Appellant submits that as applied to him in this particular set of 
circumstances, the statute is unconstitutional. 
Although this Court has previously decided that the stalking statute was not 
unconstitutional, in Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the 
circumstances surrounding Lopez and the instant case are dissimilar when the court analyzes 
the unconstitutionality as applied to Appellant. The conduct that Appellant is being 
prohibited from through the stalking statute can be innocent and lawful conduct, such as 
picketing a business or being free to lawfully remain in a public place or solicit public 
businesses. Appellant was convicted not for entering Archibald's business where he was not 
wanted, but for being near the business. Appellant had legitimate business with other 
establishments in the area and had every right to be in a public place where those other 
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I 
businesses were located. The fact that his other interests and legitimate business was 
1 
conducted near Archibald's business was irrelevant. Thus, Appellant's conduct here is not 
the type of conduct that this Court analyzed in Lopez, and should be treated differently. 
In Lopez, the defendant was romantically attracted to the victim, whom he < 
called repeatedly, made personal, face-to-face contact with, and confronted at various school 
functions. Appellant only had personal contact one time in Archibald's office where he 
demanded money. Every other incident merely involved "sightings" of Appellant, which may 
be considered bothersome or annoying, but do not necessarily fall under the stalking statute 
i 
as criminal behavior. Consequently, the stalking statute as applied to Appellant in this 
particular circumstance is unconstitutional. 
i 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse 
his conviction, or at a minimum reduce his conviction as demanded herein. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
I 
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter. 
I 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 2001. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this day of August, 2001, to: 
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM I 
JUDGMENT 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW WEISBERG, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
LAW AND MOTION 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991905379 FS 
Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Date: November 28, 2 000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: juanas 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARDS, RANDALL W. 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 28, 1955 
Video 
Tape Number: HI128 Tape Count: 22 5 
CHARGES 
1. STALKING (amended) 
Plea: Not Guilty 
HEARING 
2nd Degree Felony 
• Disposition: 10/26/2000 Guilty 
Court hears arguments as to Motion to Arrest. 
Court denies motion. 
Court hears from counsel and victim as to sentencing. Defendant 
declines to make a statement. Defendant is sentenced. 
Defense files a Certificate of Probable Cause and Notice of 
Appeal. State submits certificate. Court denies motion. A record 
has been made by the court. 
Court orders cash bail exhonerated to the defendant. 
.OKK 
i 
Case No: 991905379 
Date: Nov 28, 2 000 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of STALKING a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
_
 day of N O V ^ 2000 , Jfl= Dated this 
PAMELA/G. HEFFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
•n-^^,^ o / 1 -. «+- \ OKC: 
ADDENDUM II 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
& RULES 
Amend. XIII, § 1 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 706 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section ! . 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5,. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive arid Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color 
not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration. 
AMENDMENT XVTI 
[Election of senators.] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as part of the Constitution. 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION 1.] 
Section 
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.] 
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Time limit for adoption.] 
Section 1. [National prohibition .— Intoxicating li-
quors.] 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
705 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. XII 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble^ arid to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
\V.'..-. .-. AMENDMENTV ,•'-• 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning— Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 'same 
offehce to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. ' 
y
 '.;;.. AMENDMENTV! '..7\,."•"' 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall "enjoy, the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by aft impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. v 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people . . . • . ' / • 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to. 
the States respectively, or to the people. -
AMENDMENTXI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial power.] 
^he judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the.tJnited States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per-
sons voted for as President, and of #11 persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from.the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi-
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
President of the United States. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. Declaration of Rights 
II. State Boundaries 
III. Ordinance 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage 
'-'V: Distribution of Powers 
-VI. Legislative Department 
VII. Executive Department 
VIII. Judicial Department 
.. IX. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment 
'••'"'•" X. Education 
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns . 
'"
,:
. XI. Local Governments [Proposed! 
XII. Corporations 
XIII. Revenue and Taxation 
XIV. Public Debt 
.
 V
,XV Militia 
XVL Labor 
XVII. Water Rights 
XVIII. Forestry 
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions 
XX. Public Lands 
** XXI. Salaries 
; XXII. Miscellaneous 
XXIII. Amendment and Revision 
XXIV. Schedule 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain and establish this* CONSTITU-
TION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or 
hold office.] 
[Religious liberty] [Proposed.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process, of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] '' 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt ~ Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
Section 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] : • r 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] I 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. i896 
Sec. 2. [All polit ical power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to; alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. • 
1896 
Sec. 3 . [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part ,of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the. land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Rel igious l iberty — No property qualification 
to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rus t or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the Stfkte or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 1896 
[Religious liberty.] [Proposed.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shal l be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. T h e r e shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. [1999] 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] - .•- , .'/.--.•«# 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
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I 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense. 
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of 
the sentence required under Subsection (2) if the court finds 
that the interests of justice would be best served and makes 
specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the 
record. i?98 
76-5-102.5. Assau l t b y p r i sone r . 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause 
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 1974 
76-5-102.6. Assau l t on a c o r r e c t i o n a l officer. 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material 
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional 
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1994 
76-5-102.7. Assault against health care provider and 
emergency medical service worker — Pen-
alty. 
(1) A person who assaults a health care provider or emer-
gency medical service worker is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor if: . 
(a) the person knew that the. victim was a health care 
provider or emergency medical service worker; and 
(b) the health care provider or emergency medical 
service worker was performing.emergency or life saving 
duties within the scope of his authority at the time of the 
assault. . . . 
(2) As used in this section: . 
(a) "Emergency medical service worker" means a per-
son certified under Section 26-8a-302. 
(b) "Health care provider" has the meaning as provided 
in Section 78-14-3. 1999 
76-5-102.8. D i s a r m i n g a p e a c e officer. 
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally 
takes or removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm 
from the person or immediate presence of a person he knows 
is a peace officer: ^ 
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and 
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the. scope of 
his authority as a peace officer. * ' 1999 
76-5-103. A g g r a v a t e d a s sau l t . 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to an-
other; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
• Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
• death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner. 
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a capital felony 
or a felony of the first degree, who commits aggravated assault 
is guilty of: 
(a) a felony of the second degree if no'serious bodily 
injury was intentionally caused; or 
(b) a felony of the first degree if serious bodily injury 
was intentionally caused. 
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a capital felony or a 
felony of the first degree who commits aggravated assault is 
guilty of: 
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury 
was intentionally caused; or 
(b) a capital felony if serious bodily injury was inten-
tionally caused. . 
(3) For the purpose of this section, "serving a sentence" 
means sentenced and committed to the custody of the Depart-
ment of Corrections,, the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided, and the prisoner is: 
(a) not on parole; or 
, (b). in custody after arrest for a parole violation. 1997 
76-5-104. Consensual altercation. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of 
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that 
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or 
other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel, 
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 was used or if the defendant was engaged in 
an ultimate fighting match as defined in Section 76-9.-705. 
1997 
76-5-105. Mayhem. 
[(1)] Every person who unlawfully and intentionally de-
prives a human being of a member of his body, or disables or 
renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the tongue, puts 
out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem. 
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree. 1973 
76-5-106. H a r a s s m e n t . 
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to 
frighten or harass another, he communicates a written or 
recorded threat to commit any violent felony. 
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 1995 
76^5-106.5. Definitions —. Stalking — Injunction — 
Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: ./,-
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining 
a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly 
conveying verbal or writ ten threats or threats implied by 
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a 
person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, 
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the 
household or who regularly resided in the household 
within the prior, six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
• (a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 
reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of 
his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a 
, member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge tha t the 
specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury 
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of 
his immediate family will suffer emotional distress; 
and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear i n the specific person of bodily 
injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person 
or a member of his immediate family. 
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or 
knowingly violates a stalking injunction, or intentionally or 
knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction 
issued pursuant to this section. 
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor upon the offender's 
first violation of Subsection (2). 
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) Stalking is a thi rd degree felony if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalk-
ing; 
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an 
offense t ha t is substantially similar to the offense of 
stalking; 
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense 
in U tah or of any crime in another jurisdiction which if 
committed in U tah would be a felony, in which the victim 
of the stalking or a member of the victim's immediate 
family was also a victim of the previous felony offense; or 
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction 
issued pursuan t to Subsection (7). 
>) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601 or used other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the 
crime of stalking; 
(b) ha s been previously convicted two or more t imes of 
the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another 
jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses t ha t are substan-
tially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any 
combination, of offenses under Subsection (5); or 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of 
felony offenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction 
or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be 
felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a 
victim of the previous felony offenses. 
7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court 
1 held in abeyance for a period of time shall operate as an 
Dlication for a permanent criminal stalking injunction lim-
lg the contact of the defendant and the victim. 
(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be 
issued without a hear ing unless the defendant requests a 
hear ing a t the t ime of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, 
guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of 
plea in abeyance. The court shall give the defendant 
. notice of his r ight to request a hearing. 
(i) If the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be 
• -• . held a t the t ime of the verdict, finding, or plea of 
guilty, guilty and mental ly ill, plea of no contest, or 
acceptance of plea in abeyance unless the victim 
requests otherwise, or for good cause. 
(ii) If t h e verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty 
and mental ly ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of 
plea in abeyance was entered in a justice court, a 
certified copy of the judgment and conviction or a 
certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in 
abeyance must be filed by the victim in the district 
court as an application and request for hearing for a 
permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may 
grant the following relief: 
(i) an order res t ra ining the defendant from enter-
ing the residence, property, school, or place of employ-
ment of the victim and requiring the defendant to 
stay away from the victim and members of the 
victim's immediate family or household and to stay 
away from any specified place tha t is named in the 
order and is frequented regularly by the victim; and 
(ii) an order res t ra ining the defendant from mak-
ing contact with the victim, including an order forbid-
ding the defendant from personally or through an 
agent init iating any communication likely to cause 
annoyance or alarm, including personal, written, or 
telephone contact with the victim, the victim's em-
ployers, employees, fellow workers, or others with 
whom communication would be likely to cause annoy-
ance or alarm to the victim. 
(c) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be 
dissolved upon application of the victim to the court which 
granted the order. 
(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions 
issued pursuant to this section shall be sent by the court 
to the statewide war ran t s network or similar system. 
(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued 
pursuant to this section shall be effective statewide. 
(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this 
section shall constitute an offense of stalking. Violations 
may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking 
victim, a criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attor-
ney, or both. • ' . • 2OQO 
76-5-107. Threat aga ins t l ife or p r o p e r t y — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits a th rea t against life or property if he 
threa tens to commit any offense involving violence with intent 
to: 
(a) cause action of any na tu re by an official or volunteer 
agency organized to deal with emergencies; 
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury; or 
(c) prevent or in ter rupt the occupation of a building or 
room; place of assembly; place to which the public has 
access; or aircraft, automobile, or other form of transpor-
tation. 
(2) A threa t against life or property is a class B misde-
meanor, except if the actor's in tent is to prevent or interrupt 
the occupation of a building, a place to which the public has 
access, or a facility of public t ransportat ion operated by a 
common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony. 1988 
76-5-107.5. Proh ib i t ion of "hazing" — Defini t ions — 
Penalties. 
(1) A person is guilty of hazing if t ha t person intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly commits an act or causes another to 
commit an act that : 
(a) (i) endangers the mental or physical heal th or 
safety of another; or 
(ii) involves any brutal i ty of a physical na ture such 
as whipping, beating, branding, calisthenics, bruis-
ing, electric shocking, placing of a harmful substance 
• on the body, or exposure to the elements; or 
(iii) involves consumption of any food, liquor, drug, 
or other substance or any other physical activity tha t 
endangers the mental or physical heal th and safety of 
an individual; or 
(iv) involves any activity tha t would subject the 
individual to extreme mental stress, such as sleep 
deprivation, extended isolation from social contact, or 
conduct t ha t subjects another to extreme embarrass-
ment, shame, or humiliation; or 
(v) involves cruelty to any animal as provided in 
Section 76-9-301; and 
(b) (i) is for the purpose of initiation, admission into, 
affiliation with, holding office in, or as a condition for 
continued membership i n any organization; or 
(ii) if the actor knew tha t the victim is a member of 
or candidate for membership with a school team or 
school organization to which the actor belongs or did 
belong within the preceding two* years. 
(2) It is not a defense to prosecution of hazing tha t a person 
under 21, against whom the hazing was directed, consented to 
or acquiesced in the hazing activity. 
(3) An actor who hazes another is guilty of a: 
(a) class C misdemeanor if the conduct violates Section 
76-9-301; 
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ADDENDUM III 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
NQV2 9 2G03 /••;-,: j u - J - i •••-i~> * v x ^ 
.—. » \ • 1 : > 
IN THE SECOND IUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW WEISBERG, 
Defendant. ) Case No. 991905379 
COMES NOW the above named Defendant, above-named, by and through his attorney, 
Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal the Judgment and 
Conviction that was rendered hereon in the above entitled case on or about the 26th day of 
October, 2000, to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 28th day of November, 2000. 
W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice 
of Appeal to counsel for the Plaintiff: 
WTeber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Boulevard, Second Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 ^ ^ 
postage prepaid, on day of MSVember, 2000 
ttaxixrtv^&p^-fo 
Secretary 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Fran Lund, certify that on the 1st day of December, 2000 that I sent a 
certified copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL to the UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
^M^U^U^J^ 
Fran Lund, Clerk 
ADDENDUM IV 
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RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW WEISBURG, 
Defendant. 
) MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) Case No. 991905379 
COMES NOW the Defendant, above-named, by and through his attorney, Randall 
W. Richards, and pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure hereby files 
this Motion to Arrest Judgment. This Motion is based upon and supported by a 
Memorandum to be submitted shortly. 
DATED this day of November, 2000. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed/faxed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Motion to; 
Camille Neider 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd, Second Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 / 
postage prepaid, on this IV day of November^OOO. / 
HJAUMA 
Secretary 
( 
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RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
ANDREW WEISBURG, 
Defendant. 
NOV 0 9 2000 
) Case No. 991905379 
COMES NOW the Defendant, above-named, by and through his attorney, Randall 
W. Richards, and hereby files this Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During the spring of 1997, the Defendant, Andrew Weisberg, entered into a financial 
transaction with Wayne Ogden, with Robin Archibald and the company Avis and Archibald 
allegedly acting as an escrow agent, and as the title company. 
2. During this time the Defendant, Andrew Weisberg, allegedly delivered to Robin Archibald 
and the company Avis and Archibald a total of $115,000 in cash and checks. 
3. Andrew Weisberg never saw these funds again. 
4. On or about July 31st 1997, the Defendant, Andrew Weisberg, filed a civil complaint against 
Robin Archibald and Avis and Archibald requesting judgment on the above monies. 
5. Robin Archibald testified that during the month of August 1997, she began to receive 
unwanted contact by the Defendant which included a fax, an alleged phone call stating 
) 
"Robin you keep fucking around and your cold dead body is going to end up in a field 
somewhere.", as well as numerous appearances in the strip mall parking lot. 
6. On or about Nov. 14th the victim of the criminal case, Robin Archibald, filed a civil 
complaint in the Second Judicial District Court in which she alleged stalking type activity, 
and received a temporary restraining order restraining Andrew Weisberg from coming 
within 1000 feet of Archibald. 
7. The restraining order and the complaint were both dismissed with prejudice, upon the 
merits, by stipulation (see exhibit A)of both parties on or about the 3rd day of April 1998. 
(see attached exhibit B) 
8. The Defendant -thereafter continued driving into the parking lot, contacting various 
customers, and picketing the business. 
9. On or about 27th day of September 1999, the Defendant entered into a diversion agreement 
with the South Ogden Justice Court, wherein both Weisberg and Archibald agreed not to 
initiate any contact with each other, families, friends, associates, or co-workers.(see attached 
exhibit C). 
10. Thereafter, the Defendant continued going to the parking lot, as well as picketing the 
business. 
11. On or about Dec. 24th 1999, the defendant was charged with stalking. 
ARGUMENT 
The Defendants conviction should be arrested on the grounds that the 
statute under which he was prosecuted is unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad under the 14th and 1st Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States 
The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides due process 
guarantees to all citizens of the country, and further applies the protections to state actions. The 
U.S. Supreme Court the case of Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) held "As 
) 
generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient defmiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct 
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement". The Court went on to state: "where the Legislature fails to provide such minimal 
guidelines [to govern law-enforcement], a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep 
that allows policeman, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections."' (Id. At 
358). In the Kolender decision, the appellee, Edward Lawson, was detained and arrested on 
approximately fifteen (15) occasions between March 1975 and January 1977, under a statute 
requiring a person who loiters on the streets to provide identification of himself and to account 
for his presence when requested by the police officer to do so. The Court had significant 
problems with the statute under which Mr. Lawson was arrested, on the basis that the officer 
could arbitrarily harass an individual. 1 Based upon these problems, the Court declared the 
statute unconstitutionally vague. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has also grappled with similarly 
unconstitutional statutes. In the case of State vs. Bradshaw 541 P2d 800 (Utah 1975), the Court 
declared the Interfering With Arrest statute unconstitutionally vague. In that case the court held 
"if the intention of the Legislature was to penalize a law-abiding citizen by incarceration 
because he did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest, a statute authorizing the same is in 
violation of both the Utah and United States Constitutions". Further, in the case of Elks Lodges 
#719 & #2021 vs. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 905 P.2dll89, 1202, (Utah 1995) 
the court held "An enactment will be held unconstitutionally vague only if the terms of the law 
1 The Court in Kolender vs. Lawson stated: "our concern here is based upon the potential for arbitrarily 
suppressing First Amendment liberties", (id at 358) and, "section 647 (e) furnishes a convenient tool for harsh 
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials against particular groups deemed to merit their 
displeasure" (id at 358) and, "[it] confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons 
with a violation", (id at 358). 
o 
CM Q 
LU CC 
5 ^ 
5 a 
. D 
(5 O 
2 CD 
Q Z 
i. d 2 3 | 
gP i 
I W MS F o S 
S « 
2 u-
I? 
- o> 
3 " 
are so ambiguous that persons of ordinary intelligence are unable to determine whether their acts 
conform to the law". Finally, the court in the case of State vs. Krueger 975 P.2d 489, 495, (Utah 
App. 1999) held: "a vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to police officers, 
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers 
of arbitrary and discriminatory application". 
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the constitutionality of the stalking statute in 
the case of Salt Lake City vs. Lopez 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1997). However, the court only 
addressed a limited vagueness claim raised by the defendant, that of failing to define emotional 
distress. In Salt Lake City vs. Lopez the court defined the standard to be used in a vagueness 
challenge as follows: "the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define 
an offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement", 
(id at 1265) 
In the present case, the stalking statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad both 
facially and as applied to this Defendant's conduct. The statute is unclear as to what conduct 
is prohibited, in that it impermissibly prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. An 
individual who exercises his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression by picketing a 
business establishment that he believes conducts questionable business clearly falls within the 
parameters defined by §76 - 5 - 106.5. This individual repeatedly engages in a visual or 
physical proximity to a person, causes that person to suffer emotional distress, and has 
reasonable belief that the person will suffer emotional distress. The very purpose for picketing 
is to in fact be in a physical or visual proximity to a person or business and to cause emotional 
distress by the picketing. The statute is therefore facially unconstitutional due to vagueness. 
Furthermore, the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant Andrew 
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Weisberg. In the present case, the defendant was arrested or harassed by the police for 
picketing Avis and Archibald both in the parking lot and on the road. In fact, his picket sign 
was seized on one occasion. 
On or about Nov. 14th the victim of the criminal case, Robin Archibald, filed a civil 
complaint in the Second Judicial District Court in which she alleged stalking type activity, and 
received a temporary restraining order restraining Andrew Weisberg from coming within 1000 
feet of Archibald. The restraining order and the complaint were both dismissed with prejudice, 
upon the merits, by stipulation of both parties on or about the 3rd day of April 1998. 
On or about 27th day of September 1999, the Defendant entered into a diversion 
agreement with the South Ogden Justice Court, wherein both Weisberg and Archibald agreed 
not to initiate any contact with each other, families, friends, associates, or co-workers. The 
Defendant continued to go to the parking lot, and continued picketing, and was allowed to do 
so at certain occasions by certain police officers, and was told to discontinue on other occasions 
by other police officers. 
Over the course of a two-year period, the Defendant was both prohibited and allowed 
certain conduct in the parking lot at the Avis and Archibald strip mall. The Defendant was 
restrained by a court order, and then shortly thereafter, allowed, by the dismissal with prejudice, 
to continue in the conduct. The law-enforcement likewise arbitrarily allowed and prohibited 
the Defendants' conduct with no logical explanation or articulable definition as to why and 
when his conduct was prohibited. The South Ogden Justice Court likewise issued an order 
wherein both Weisberg and Archibald agreed not to initiate any contact with each other, 
families, friends, associates, or co-workers. Thereafter that order was arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily applied. On certain days Weisberg was allowed to be present in the parking 
lot, yet on others he was ordered to leave. On one occasion, as he was driving out of the narking 
) i 
lot, yet on others he was ordered to leave. On one occasion, as he was driving out of the parldng 
lot, and stopped at the stop sign, Archibald pulled alongside, rolled down her window, and 
attempted to initiate contact. Weisberg simply drove off. Weisberg was stopped for this contact, 
yet Archibald never received so much as a warning. 
The Defendant's conduct was therefore "arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced", 
which enforcement is prohibited under the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
arrest the judgment Of conviction in this case, and dismiss theuefewrges against tfee-fi^fendant. 
DATED this % day of November, 2000. 
)ALL W. RICH; 
l^ torney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/FACSIMILE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/faxed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Memorandum to: 
Camille Neider 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd, Second Floor 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Fax (801) 399-8307 
postage prepaid, on this l_ day of November, 2000. 
MlW^f ^Cvhu'to 
Secretary 
David R. Hamilton (1318) 
Gary R. Williams (7019) 
SMITH KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone; (801) 476-0303 
Facsimile: (801)476-0399 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
ROBIN ARCHIBALD, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
ANDREW WEISBERG, ] 
Defendant. 
1 STIPULATION AND MOTION TO 
1 DISSOLVE ORDER FOR EX-PARTE 
1 RESTRAINING ORDER AND TO 
I DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE 
i Civil No; 970908010CV 
> Judge Michael D. Lyon 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
Plaintiff and Defendant, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate, agree 
and move as follows: 
1. The Order for Ex-parte Restraining Order entered by Judge West on December 
26, 1997, shall be dissolved. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint in this action as against Defendant may be dismissed, with 
prejudice, and upon its merits, 
3. Each Party shall bear their own costs, expenses, and attorney's fees with respect 
I 
u 
to the claims that are dismissed in accordance with the foregoing Stipulation, 
4, The Parties jointly move the Court to enter the attached Order in conformity with 
the terms of this Stipulation. 
DATED this day of February, 1998. 
Geoffrey L, Clark 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C. 
by: 
David R. Hamilton 
Gary R. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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David R. Hamilton (1318) 
Gary R. Williams (7019) 
SMITH KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone; (801) 476-0303 
Facsimile: (801)476-0399 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
ROBIN ARCHIBALD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW WEISBERG, 
Defendant. 
ORDER TO DISSOLVE EX-PARTE 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND TO 
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No; 970905010CV 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Based upon the foregoing Stipulation and Motion, the Court being fully advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Order for Ex-Part e Restraining Order entered by Judge West on 
December 26, 1997 in this matter is hereby dissolved. 
2. Plaintiffs Complaint in this action as against Defendant be and the same is hereby 
dismissed, with prejudice," and upon its merits. 
3. Each party shall bear their own costs, expenses and attorney's fees with respect to 
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the claims that arc dismissed in accordance with this Order, / 
MADE AND ENTERED THIS 3 day o ? § W n ^ , 1998, 
'$A 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon 
READ AND APPROVED BY: 
As 
Geoffrey L. Clark 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2 
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON # 1607 
Attorney for Defendant 
8X8 - 26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone (801) 399-9291 
I N THE JUSTICE COURT OF SOUTH OGDEN CITY, 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTH OGDEN CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ANDREW MARK WESBERG, 
Defendant. 
DIVERSION AGREEMENT 
: Case No. 
WHEREAS, the above-named defendant, ANDREW M. JVPSBERGL tas been charged with the 
crime of Disorderly Conduct, which occurred on or about the^y* day of June 1999, and South Ogden City 
having agreed that a diversion agreement would serve the ends of justice in the aisve-matter, the 
defendant being a substantial member of his community; 
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED, subject to the approval of the Court, and pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 77-2-5 et seq, UCA, 1953, as amended: 
1, Defendant hereby waives his right to a speedy trial. 
2, Defendant shall not initiate any direct or indirect contact with Robin Archibald, her 
family, friends, associates and/or co-workers and that Robin Archibald shall not initiate 
any direct or indirect contact with the Defendant, his family, friends, associates and/or 
co-workers, 
* . In event defendant complies with his agreement, the Court on its own motion on ^O day of 
fcx>» ATi ' n * & ^ — r J & shall dismiss the information, and the defendant shall not be subject to 
further prosecution from the offenses involved, nor any lesser included offense arising out to the same 
series of events. 
South Ogdtn City V, Weisberg 
Diversion Agreement 
Page 2gf 2 
In the event of alleged vioiat'cn cf the terms of this agreement an order to show cause shall be 
issued and after the hearing, the Court may authorize the prosecuting authority to proceed with 
prosecution of the aforementioned crime. 
DATED this: day of September 1999. 
/ 
/ j 
^/cA 
^-ANDREW MARK WEISBERG 
Defendant 
SHAW 
Ity Attorney 
&^/tMu*>^ 
5HNELAIR HUTCHISON 
^Attorney for Defendant 
Approved this ^ 7 day of September 1999, 
BY THE COURT* 
-•fc^ V 
JUSTtCE COURTAGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Diversion 
Agreement to the following named persons, postage prepaid the day-'^ f.September 1599: 
Kenneth D. Eredshaw 
South Cgcten City Attorney 
3366 West 400 South 
West Haven, Utah 34315 
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